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Abstract 
 
The paper introduces a theoretical model to show how in a spatial framework characterized by 
urban-rural imbalances, the production of goods and services decreases moving from urban to 
rural areas. Specifically in rural and peripheral areas, the market and the public sector might 
supply an insufficient level of goods and services due to higher distance costs and lack of 
financial resources. Cooperatives and nonprofit organizations, i.e. social enterprises, are able to 
overcome distance costs and therefore spatial inequalities, by developing a productive and 
distributive function in marginalized areas, ensuring a fair and equal treatment among residents.  
Moreover, cooperatives and nonprofit organizations endorse the inclusiveness of the labor 
market, and raise peoples’ intrinsic motivation.  
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1. Introduction 
Cities are important drivers of political change and social innovation, as they attract investments 
and provide infrastructural services that foster growth and development across a wide portion of 
territory. Nevertheless, the urban environment has also been addressed as the major cause of 
several problems affecting rural areas. Indeed, cities polarize the space activating processes of 
marginalization, and this happens particularly in times of recession, when the action of the 
institutions (firms, public administrations, financial intermediaries…) is limited to what it can be 
considered “financially accountable”. Marginalized areas become empty places, where 
“economic emptiness” can be measured in terms of insufficient welfare, lack of resources, and 
stagnation of the economic activities. As a reaction, in these not necessarily scarcely populated 
places, there is room for residents to activate alternative solutions to overcome the lack of 
development and to generate a subsidiary welfare supply.  
Due to their governance and aims pursued, non-profit organizations are the most appropriate 
social aggregations to rise peoples’ intrinsic motivation, while cooperatives and social 
enterprises represent the most suitable institutions to connect the social motivation to the 
economic one, narrowing the gap between productivity and wages. Following this idea, in 
marginalized areas, residents are incentivized to found members-owned organizations by virtue 
of an economic rationale, which motivates members to focus on achievements rather than on 
monetary compensations. Finally, cooperatives and social enterprises can foster the connection 
between for profit and non-profit activities, turning the self-production attitude of the latter into a 
broader vision coherent with a mutualistic approach and a social attitude.  
In the next two paragraphs, we present a literature overview (paragraph 2) and an economic 
model (paragraph 3) illustrating how the behavior of private and public institutions is affected by 
distance costs, and why cooperatives and the non-profit sector are incentivized to compensate the 
emerging spatial imbalances. In the last paragraph, we briefly discuss the results of the 
theoretical analysis and we elaborate a set of policy recommendations. 
 
 
2. Literature review  
Limao and Venables (1999) in their seminal work envisage the relevance of transport and 
distance costs as determinants for enhancing participation of territorial areas to the economic 
production networks. We follow their approach, but, rather than on trade, we focus on the 
exposure of rural areas to processes of marginalization. Specifically, several authors evidence 
that rural markets are characterized by low levels of competition, thus resulting less attractive for 
profit-oriented companies (Kodrzycki 1994; Warner 2009; Bel et al. 2010; Warner and Hefetz 
2003, Warner and Hefetz 2008). Indeed, the lack of market discipline discourages efficiency 
gains, therefore transaction costs tend to rise and governments are forced to exercise a greater 
oversight. Moreover, high transaction costs are often associated with contracting out (Kirkpatrick 
et al. 2006; Bel et al., 2010) and with processes of internal reform aimed at improving the 
efficiency in the production of publicly delivered services (Bel and Costas, 2006; Dijkgraaf and 
Gradus, 2007; Bel and Mur, 2009). Finally, in scarcely competitive environments, transaction 
costs increase also for services beneficiaries (i.e. citizens living in marginalized areas). The 
literature on the urban-rural dichotomy offers a significant evidence of a turning point in the 
debate, that evolves toward urban-rural linkages (Champion and Hugo 2004), and specifically on 
the re-urbanization of rural areas. However, even when the linkages between rural and urban 
areas are intense, due to socioeconomic marginalization and physical remoteness, peripheral 
areas risk to be served neither from the public, nor from the private sector (Martin 2015, Caffyn 
and Dahlstrom 2005, Dijkgraaf & Gradus 2003; Levin & Tadelis 2012).  
Thirdly, we briefly summarize the wide intellectual and empirical research on social capital. 
Specifically, we recall the seminal studies of Putnam (1993, 1995) and Coleman (1988, 1990), 
and we stress how the process of social capital accumulation can evolve either towards positive 
outcomes or toward the “dark sides” and exclusive processes of growth (Putnam 2000). By 
referring to this argument, we formulate the hypothesis that, in times of recession, rural areas 
must choose between two processes of social capital accumulation. The first process reflects a 
positive relation among the actors involved, leading to collaborative and strong social ties and 
facilitating the achievement of community based solutions for compensating the inefficient 
supply of public and market goods (Putnam 2000). As a by-product, community-based solutions 
reduce also distance costs for the public sector and for profit-oriented firms, fostering a way out 
of the economic crisis. The second pattern unleashes the dark side of social capital: when the 
supply of collective services does not meet the needs of residents, and/or the latter perceive that 
local resources have been subtracted through a mix of taxes and inefficient public policies, 
illegal and criminal activities benefit of a fertile environment to proliferate.  
A remedial action of policy makers at this regard is crucial. Specifically, we claim that policies 
aimed at fostering the development of the cooperative sector in “middle zones” [see par.2] 
incentivize also the accumulation of the pure social capital in marginalized areas by activating 
mechanisms which induce citizens to prefer the legal to the illegal community-based actions. 
Indeed, in the inframarginal areas characterized by “shifting motivations” (i.e. a mixture of 
monetary and non-monetary incentives), the demand of goods and services can be satisfied by 
cooperatives and social enterprises, as by their nature they are “not for profit institutions”, i.e. a 
blend of peoples’ non-profit attitude and institutional concerns for capacity building and growth. 
Specifically, cooperatives are able to internalize costs by paying lower monetary wages and 
dividends compared to for-profit firms (Becchetti at alii 2012, Narcy 2011, Weisbrod 1983, 
Leete 2000, Frey 1997, Preston 1989). Specifically, in places where distance costs are 
unsustainable for profit oriented firms, nonprofit organizations instead are able to recruit 
intrinsically motivated workers, i.e. workers who decide to participate in the production process 
accepting lower or even null wages, as their compensation is first of all of non-monetary nature 
(but anyway coherent with their individual interests). The development of non-profit 
organizations in marginalized areas facilitates the consolidation of the cooperative movement in 
inframarginal areas. Finally, a well-developed cooperative sector fosters the competitiveness of 
for profit businesses, abating the costs and rising the productivity of the inputs employed in the 
production processes. 
 
 
3. A model for evaluating distance costs between urban and rural areas 
The theoretical framework illustrates how land matters in determining the localization and the 
degree of development of the market and of the public sector along a continuous that goes from 
urban to rural areas. The economic analysis, instead, focuses on how distance costs influence the 
supply of goods and services, making the organizational features of the economic institutions 
relevant in selecting the most effective and efficient actors. 
The logical framework, as reported in figure 1 in appendix, is made of three vertexes (“Urban”, 
“Rural” and “Institutions”), and three sides (“People”, “Resources” and “Land”). On an 
orthogonal axis with respect to the “triangle” proposed, it accounts also for the scale of measure 
adopted to discuss the phenomenon under inquiry. We focus our analysis on the linkages among 
the institutional organization of a territory and landscape, as we suspect that landscape is not 
neutral in determining the socioeconomic development of a community. By adopting an 
institutional perspective, “Land” is out of the analysis, as everything is perceived in terms of 
“People” (labour), and “Resources” (capital). We try to reintroduce “Land” through a place-
based economic model that lies its rationale on the concept of distance costs.  
Specifically, we assume that land (L) is a continuum that goes from Urban (U) to Rural (R) areas. 
Land is characterized by a heterogeneous level of distance costs, population density and per 
capita income. At institutional level, we distinguish four classes of actors (profit-oriented firms, 
the public sector, cooperatives and social enterprises, non-profit institutions). Finally, we assume 
that institutions supply residents (people living in a specific place L0) with a generic output Y, 
and that Y’s production costs do not depend on land, so that at territorial level the only costs that 
matter are “distance costs”. Specifically, distance costs increase as far as one moves from U 
toward R due to several reasons (transport costs, scarce availability of infrastructures, transaction 
costs, etc.). On the other hand, as far as one moves from U to R, population density and per 
capita income decrease, therefore the aggregate demand drops.  
 
3.1 Market equilibria and profit maximization choices 
We now explain how the market equilibrium (the outcome of the exchange process between 
institutions and residents) changes moving across land. Due to the assumptions made, the 
aggregate demand is a decreasing function of land (where L = 0 indicates the central place), as 
population density decreases and households have lower incomes. On the other hand, the supply 
function is an increasing function of L, as moving from U to R distance costs tend to increase. 
Therefore, profit oriented firms have a convenience to serve only a specific share of land, 
generating spatial inequalities. Moreover, in order to make extra-profits, they have an incentive 
to serve a place as much as it is closer to U. In order to keep the analysis as simple as possible, 
we provide an example with linear demand and supply curves. 
 
§ An example 
Assume that the behavior of the industry of good Y can be approximated to the behavior of a 
single profit oriented firm characterized by a constant returns to scale technology. The industry 
serves three marketplaces: the market A, located in the central place (U); the market B, located in 
an inframarginal area, and the market C, located in a peripheral area. The three marketplaces are 
characterized by distance costs that are: 
- increasing in the level of output Y (in market A distance costs are zero); 
- increasing in the distance from U for a given level of Y (0 < ADCB < ADCC). 
Moreover, each marketplace is characterized by a linear aggregate demand, such that 
𝑝𝐴(𝑌) = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑌𝐴, 𝑝𝐵(𝑌) = 𝑎′ − 𝑏′𝑌𝐵 𝑝𝐶(𝑌) = 𝑎
′′ − 𝑏′′𝑌𝐶   
With a > a’ > a”, and b < b’ < b”. Finally, we assume that in market C average distance costs 
are higher than the maximum willingness to pay for Y (ADCC > a”), and that there is a zero 
possibility of profitable arbitrage
1
.  
The results of the analysis are summarized in Figure 1. Notice how the three market equilibria 
are characterized by a decreasing level of output Y and by increasing prices p, and how in market 
C, in the absence of public subsidies, the optimal supply is null. Both in A and in B profits are 
null, but if firms collude the profit that they can obtain is higher in A rather than in B. 
                                                 
1
 The absence of profitable arbitrage means that residents face higher distance costs than the industry, therefore it is 
not convenient for an individual to buy good Y in market A and resell it in market B or C creating a secondary 
market that cannibalizes the demand faced by the industry. 
Therefore, people living in place C are excluded from the market. Alternatively, they have to 
move either to place B, either to place A in order to buy the good Y, but in this case the market 
charges on peripheral residents the distance costs. In both cases, there is evidence of a spatial 
inequality. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – The exchange process in the (p, Y) plan. 
 
The same issues can be explained in the (L, Y) plan, where Y denotes the quantity of Y exchanged 
in place L0. It is worth noticing how the blue lines indicate the quantity of Y exchanged in the 
absence of distance costs, while the red lines indicate the quantity of Y exchanged when distance 
costs occur. On the other hand, the dotted lines indicate the quantity of Y exchanged when firms 
collude. Therefore: 
- the continuous blue line indicates the quantity of Y exchanged in the absence of distance 
costs under perfect competition (Y
*
); 
- the continuous red line indicates the quantity of Y exchanged when distance costs occur 
under perfect competition (Y
d
); 
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- the dotted blue line indicates the quantity of Y exchanged when distance costs occur and 
firms collude (Y
c
); 
- the dotted red line indicates the quantity of Y exchanged when distance costs occur and 
firms collude. 
It is easy to recognize that the marketplace A is the more developed and it is not affected by 
distance costs. Secondly, marketplace B is in the middle, as it serves a lower aggregate demand 
(less people with lower income), and positive distance costs contribute to rise costs. Finally, the 
marketplace C is the less developed, and it exists only when distance costs are null. Clearly, a 
significant abatement of distance costs might contribute to increase the share of land served by 
the industry of good Y, including also the marketplace C. Specifically, the share of land served 
by the industry Y is that one corresponding to the segment 𝐴𝐸̅̅ ̅̅ , where E is the first place in which 
the demand of Y is null when distance costs occur. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 – The exchange process in the (Y, L) plan. 
 
 
 
3.2 Public expenditure 
Distance costs might play an important role also in determining the effective level of per capita 
public expenditure g = (Public Expenditure)/(Population). Specifically, assume that the public 
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Y
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cd 
E E’ 
sector fixes a homogeneous level of per capita public expenditure, and that the public 
infrastructure (consider for example a hospital) is built in the central place. When distance costs 
are positive and increasing as far as one moves from U to R, the net level of per capita public 
expenditure decreases from g
max
 to g
min
, raising a specific kind of spatial inequality (see Figure 
3). Moreover, in certain cases distance costs might determine perverse effects on land: in places 
where distance costs overcome the level of per capita public expenditure, people obtain a 
negative contribution to their wellbeing from the public sector. We observe how, while 
inequality is a necessary cause (but not a sufficient one), a detriment to wellbeing is a sufficient 
cause, but not a legitimation, for illegal and criminal activities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 – Net contribution across land of a constant per capita public expenditure. 
 
 
 
3.3 Household production and nonprofit activities  
 
Non-profit activities contribute to reduce spatial inequality, as their economic performance is 
inversely proportional to the level of income that people earn, and consequently to the level of 
goods and services provided by public and private institutions. Specifically, under certain 
circumstances, non-profit institutions can reward volunteers and donors with gifts that are more 
g
max
 
0 
g
min
 
U R 
valuable than the wage offered in the same place by profit-oriented firms and by the public 
sector. 
As an example, consider the case in which residents must buy at least a minimum consumption 
basket C
min
 in order to live in a given place L0, where p0 is the price of C in place L0. They 
receive a wage w0 for each hour worked, and they receive a reward w’ for each hour volunteered. 
Each resident is endowed with the same level of time T. In the absence of non-profit institutions, 
the solution of the utility maximization problem (see Appendix) does not exist when w is too 
low, as when wT < pC
min
 people are unable to pay for the minimum living standards. In a static 
framework, marginalized residents are incentivized to employ in illegal or criminal activities in 
order to compensate the income-expenditure gap (migration is not allowed in the model as it 
requires time). When this situation occurs, the non-profit sector can provide a legal and ethical 
alternative by offering rewards (monetary or non-monetary) in exchange for volunteering, 
allowing marginalized residents to achieve a decent standard of living. As in the central place a 
significant share of the demand is satisfied by the market and by the public sector, leading to 
consumption patterns that overcome the minimum living standards, it is reasonable to expect 
increasing rewards as far as one moves toward peripheral areas, because where the market 
supply of goods and services is lower, non-profit institutions are asked to pursue more urgent 
(and therefore more valuable) needs. We lay on the consideration that the opportunity cost of one 
hour of volunteering is the wage corresponding to one hour of paid job (w), and that the reward 
obtained for one hour of volunteering corresponds to the value of its marginal productivity (w’), 
that is increasing in the distance from the central place. In figure 4 we illustrate why in peripheral 
areas people are incentivized to participate in non-profit activities, while in central areas instead 
they are incentivized to participate in the labor market. Specifically, the difference (w’ – w) is 
positive along the segment 𝐸𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ , while it is negative after E. Due to shocks involving the demand 
and the supply curves on the markets of goods and services and to changes in welfare needs, the 
difference (w’ – w) can be highly volatile. Therefore the inframarginal areas nearby point E are 
characterized by frequent “motivational shifts”, meaning with it that an equilibrium between the 
income and the expenditure can be pursued by rebalancing the mix of non-profit and for profit 
activities. In these “middle zones”, cooperatives and social enterprises are the most efficient 
institutions, as by their nature they integrate social motivations with economic interests, avoiding 
frequent reorganizations that rise costs and determine the inefficiency of the production process. 
The development of the cooperative sector and the start-up of new social enterprises are 
important also for other reasons. First, they contribute to raise the price competitiveness and the 
sustainability of the goods and services exchanged in the markets, as they use technologies that 
are both efficient and socially responsible. Second, they pursue goals of social interest,  therefore 
they reduce the costs charged to the public sector for achieving a decent level of welfare. Third, 
they guarantee a stable demand of welfare services produced by non-profit activities, raising the 
value of the rewards offered to volunteers, screening the non-profit outputs according to their 
efficiency and their ethical content.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 – Incentives for non-profit activities. 
E U 
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3.4 Spatial inequalities and equal opportunities 
 
In this paragraph, we discuss how spatial inequalities raise concerns on the need of achieving 
equal opportunities among residents in terms of participation in the labor market and in non-
profit activities, as, even by allowing residents to move across land in search of the most paid 
jobs, distance costs affect the individual utility to apply for them. This issue is illustrated in 
Figure 5, where we compare the wage function w and the reward function w’ with the distance 
costs for residents living in three different places (U, E, R). Specifically, allowing citizens 
mobility, in the absence of distance costs, the most paid jobs are assigned to the most efficient 
workers, as in equilibrium, when the ability of each worker is observable, the for profit sector 
hires all those workers whose productivity is equal or higher of the real wage offered, within the 
constraint imposed by a finite aggregate demand. In this case, it is possible for a resident living 
in C to apply for a work in the central place, obtaining a high wage; therefore, there is no reason 
to suspect a lack of equal opportunities among urban residents and peripheral residents. For the 
same reason, the most rewarded non-profit activities are assigned to the most motivated and 
capable volunteers, as, when the non-profit sector exists, it hires all the volunteers whose 
productivity is higher of the reward offered, within the limits of the constraint imposed by a 
finite aggregate demand.  
When, instead, land is characterized by linear distance costs affecting residents’ mobility, the 
latter must compare the utility of the net wage offered by the industry and public sector (gross 
wage minus distance costs) with the disutility of the job proposed. Similarly, when residents 
decide to apply for a volunteering position in the non-profit sector, they must compare the net 
value of the reward (gross reward minus distance costs) with the disutility of the activity that 
they must perform. Clearly, in both cases people face a subjective assessment, depending on 
their skills and on their attitude to mobility. However, it is possible to highlight some general 
issues.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 – Wages, rewards and distance costs 
 
Specifically, a resident living in the central place (U ) can achieve the most paid job positions, 
but has no access to most non-profit activities (in the example proposed, he has convenience to 
volunteer either locally or in the most remote places, if the reward is enough to compensate the 
distance costs). Therefore, residents living in the central place that are employed by neither the 
public nor the private sector have an incentive either to migrate, either to participate locally in 
non-profit activities. Similarly, a resident living in R can volunteer in the most rewarded non-
profit activities, but has access only to high wage job positions (if the wage offered overcomes 
distance costs), as in middle areas distance costs are higher than the wage offered by the 
industry. Furthermore, high skilled residents living in R, in the absence of rewarded non-profit 
activities, have an incentive to migrate to the central place, in order to reduce distance costs and 
w(L) 
w’(L) 
U E R 
obtain high wages. Finally, residents living in E can choose only between jobs and non-profit 
activities characterized, respectively, by average wages and average rewards, as the most paid 
positions are accessible only by paying high distance costs.  
We conclude this section with three remarks. First, we notice how, due to the assumptions made, 
the model predicts a scarce presence of migrants in the middle zones, and a multicultural 
composition of residents in the central place and in peripheral areas. Therefore middle zone are 
adapt to accumulate bonding social capital, while central and peripheral areas are adapt to 
accumulate bridging social capital. Second, the model suggests how: 
- in the central place the for profit sector offer high wages, while the non- profit sector 
offers low wages; 
- in middle zones both the for profit and the non-profit sector offer average wages; 
- in peripheral areas the for profit sector offer low or null wages, while the non-profit 
sector offer high wages. 
Therefore, the central place and the peripheral areas are characterized by a higher level of 
income inequality with respect to the central areas. It might be of interest to investigate if this 
income gap exists and is justified by a heterogeneous productivity of labor and volunteering 
activities.  
Finally, it is worth noticing how peoples’ net utility (wages minus disutility of effort minus 
distance costs) decreases as far as citizens find a job that is distant from their residence, as 
distance costs increase. Indeed, people’s commuting reduces the individual utility of labor and 
non-profit activities. The disutility of commuting can be partially reduced by peoples’ intrinsic 
motivation, as it reduces the disutility of effort, but anyway it raises concerns on the opportunity 
of achieving a broader diffusion of work-from-home activities.  
 5. Conclusions 
 
The paper focuses on the analysis of the economic determinants of spatial inequality. 
Specifically, we illustrate why the market and the public sector are sometimes unable to satisfy 
the needs of peripheral or rural areas. Indeed, profits are more consistent in places characterized 
by high population density and high per capita incomes, i.e. urban areas, and the impact of fiscal 
policy can be countered by increasing distance costs, as the latter reduce the efficiency of the 
measures adopted. Additionally, given a fixed and positive level of per capita expenditure (net of 
taxes), under certain circumstances distance costs lead to the impoverishment of people living in 
marginal areas, activating an unsustainable process of economic divergence.  
Specifically, distance costs can generate government and market failures: a cost-opportunity 
analysis shows how distance costs affect firms’ activity reducing the share of land supplied by 
the industry. On the other side, the lower income and population density arising in the 
peripheral/rural areas are at the basis of the mismatch among the supply and demand that 
generates the absence of market activities.  
Distance costs affect also the optimal level of the public expenditure generating a perverse effect 
on residents receiving a negative contribution in terms of net public expenditure. The latter 
create incentives for residents to act illegally, especially when public policies pretend to provide 
a positive contribution to welfare, while indeed they are detracting local resources.  
Subsequently, we illustrate how cooperatives and non-profit organizations can compensate the 
lack of private and public supply, fostering a fair and equal treatment among residents. The 
decreasing opportunity cost for free time of workers living in peripheral/rural areas explains 
from a rational point of view the emergence of cooperatives and nonprofit organizations. In fact, 
the opportunity costs of free time are lower in peripheral areas, as wages are null or lower than in 
urban areas, while peoples’ needs can be satisfied mainly or only through household production 
and the constitution of member-owned organizations (Le Vay 1983). Therefore, people living in 
marginalized areas are incentivized to take part in the informal economy, while they have limited 
access to the formal economy (Salamon et alii 2011).  
Finally, we discuss how spatial inequalities raise concerns on the need of achieving equal 
opportunities among residents in terms of participation in the labor market and in non-profit 
activities, as, even by allowing residents to move across land in search of better paid jobs, 
distance costs affect their individual utility to apply for them. 
Laying on these issues, we elaborate the following set of policy recommendations: 
- the public sector must manage carefully the implementation of public policies in remote 
places and marginalized areas, as the existence of distance costs determine 
counterintuitive effects, i.e. territorial imbalances and the impoverishment of 
marginalized areas; the gross per capita public expenditure, therefore, should increase 
proportionally to the rise of the distance costs; 
- policy makers interested in landscape development should pay particular attention to 
incentivize the non-profit sector in peripheral areas, in order to endow marginalized 
residents with an alternative source of income, that becomes the only one in places where 
the market and the public sector are absent; 
- moreover, policy makers should foster the development of the cooperative sector and of 
social enterprises in the inframarginal areas characterized by “shifting motivations”, in 
order to build new connections between the for profit and the non-profit side of the 
economy, raising at the same time profit-oriented firms’ competitiveness and social 
inclusion; 
- financial institutions and public administrations should manage to abate distance costs 
through ad hoc infrastructural policies aimed at improving both the material and the 
immaterial networks at economic and at individual level, as distance costs generate 
unequal opportunities among residents, income inequality, and a scarce effectiveness of 
labor and volunteering activities. 
As regards the non-profit sector, we have observed how people living in marginalized areas have 
a “structural” propensity to be involved in informal activities, but the concept of “informal 
activities” includes both non-profit ones, and illegal or criminal ones. Therefore, marginalized 
residents face a choice between two alternatives. The first one discovers the dark side of social 
capital and leads to the development of an illegal economy, which inexorably undermines the 
chances of social development and economic growth of citizens and firms. The second one leads 
to reinforce social capital boundaries and networks. In this hypothesis, cooperatives and the non-
profit sector provide an autonomous supply of goods and services at lower costs, repolarizing 
marginalized spaces according to people’s needs. Cooperatives and nonprofit organizations in 
fact, contribute to break the twofold vicious cycle, which goes from the social and cultural 
impoverishment to the increase of the social insecurity, and from the latter to the spread of 
distrust among citizens and the legal institutions. Indeed, the creation and intensification of an 
adequate process of accumulation of “pure” social capital may contrast organized crime in the 
areas where its presence is massive, distorting the rules of functioning of markets and 
jeopardizing the social and economic development. 
Specifically, social capital represents a productive resource just as financial, environmental, or 
human capital, therefore requires investments and generates returns in the form of cooperative 
behaviors, better communication and coordination between members and opportunity to meet 
their needs (Valentinov 2004). Cooperatives and the nonprofit organizations in this perspective 
are seen as potential tools for economic development because they can guarantee what for-profit 
organizations and people operating individually do not: they can build stock of social capital, 
give members a “voice” to advocate change in government policies, promote local ownership 
and control of capital, create jobs, and fight organized crime. At economic level, they are able to 
reduce spatial inequality relying on different incentives structures, and to unleash the potential of 
the informal economy in times of recession by recruiting workers available to accept lower 
wages in return of the production of goods and services that better guarantee the satisfaction of 
their basic needs. 
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Mathematical appendix 
We begin by providing the following definitions: 
- 𝑌 ∈ [0, +∞) is the output produced by the local industry; 
- 𝐿 ∈ [0, +∞) the distance from the central place, where L = 0 represents the central place (the 
urban area);  
- m(L) = m0 – m1L = m0 [1 – (m1/ m0)L] = m0 (1 – μmL), where m(L) ≥ 0, is households’ nominal 
income (we assume that it is decreasing as far as a household lives from the central place); 
- n(L) = n0 – n1L = n0 [1 – (n1/ n0)L] = n0 (1 – μnL), where n(L) ≥ 0, indicates population living in 
place L (we assume that it is decreasing as far as one moves toward rural areas). 
 
We use these variables to build the aggregate demand function. Specifically, consider the 
following household’s utility maximization problem, where R  indicates free time, and T is the 
disposable time: 
 [1]    max 𝑈(𝑌, 𝑅) = 𝑌𝛼𝑅𝛽 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑝𝑌 + 𝑤𝑅 = 𝑚(𝐿) 
 
For a given L, the optimal demands of Y  and R are 
 
[2]    𝑌∗ =
𝛼
𝛼+𝛽
𝑚(?̅?)
𝑝
=
𝑀𝑌(?̅?)
𝑝
𝑅∗ =
𝛽
𝛼+𝛽
𝑚(?̅?)
𝑤
=
𝑀𝑅(?̅?)
𝑤
. 
 
It is worth noticing how the optimal demand of good Y is a non-linear decreasing function both 
of p and L. Rather than log-linearizing, in order to avoid null marginal revenues, we approximate 
the optimal demand function to a linear specification as 
 
𝑌 = 𝑎𝑀𝑌(?̅?) − 𝑏𝑝 
 
therefore we obtain the aggregate demand for place L by summing up the individual demands of 
the n(L) identical residents 
 
𝑌𝑑 = ∑ (𝑎𝑀𝑌(?̅?) − 𝑏𝑝)𝑛(?̅?) = 𝑛(?̅?)𝑎𝑀𝑌(?̅?) − 𝑛(?̅?)𝑏𝑝. 
 
It follows that the inverse aggregate demand of good Y is equal to 
 
[3]   𝑝 =
𝑎𝑀𝑌(?̅?)
𝑏
−
𝑌
𝑛(?̅?)𝑏
=
𝛼
𝛼+𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0𝑛0(1 – 𝜇𝑚𝐿)(1 – 𝜇𝑛𝐿)−𝑌
𝑏𝑛0(1 – 𝜇𝑛𝐿)
= 𝐴(?̅?) − 𝐵(?̅?)𝑌 
 
with 𝜕𝐴/𝜕𝐿 < 0, 𝜕𝐵/𝜕𝐿 > 0. 
Now, assume that the industry of good Y is composed of a multitude of small firms localized in 
the central place and characterized by a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas technology. 
Industry Y’s behaviour therefore can be approximated to that one of a single profit maximizing 
firm characterized by the same technology solving the following profit maximization algorithm 
 
[PM1]   max 𝑝(𝑌)𝑌 − 𝑤𝐿 − 𝑟𝐾 𝑠. 𝑡. 𝑌 = 𝐿𝛾𝐾1−𝛾 
 
Under perfect competition, the equilibrium between the aggregate demand and the aggregate 
supply is found for p
*
 = AC
min
. Due to the assumption of constant returns to scale, the total cost 
function is linear in Y, therefore AC(Y) = MC(Y) = c. The level of output Y
*
is found by simply 
replacing p
*
 in the aggregate demand function. If firms collude, the optimal solution is instead 
MR(Y) = MC(Y) = c, or alternatively, p
c
 = [1 + μr]MC(Y) = c[1 + μr]. It is worth noticing how, in 
order to serve the  place L0, we assume that the industry faces linear distance costs that are 
increasing both in L and Y. Specifically, the profit maximization algorithm, after having solved 
the cost minimization problem, can be rewritten as 
 
max 𝜋 = 𝑝(𝑌)𝑌 − 𝑐𝑌 − 𝑑?̅?𝑌 
 
Where d?̅?Y are the distance costs. Indeed,  
 
𝑐𝑌 + 𝑑?̅?𝑌 = 𝑐 (1 +
𝑑
𝑐
?̅?) 𝑌 = 𝑐(1 + 𝜇𝑑?̅?)𝑌 = 𝑐[1 + 𝜇𝑑(?̅?)]𝑌,  
 
where μd(L) is a linear function in Y. Therefore, the profit maximization algorithm can be 
rewritten as 
 
[PM2]      max 𝜋 = 𝑝(𝑌)𝑌 − 𝑐[1 + 𝜇𝑑(?̅?)]𝑌, 
 
and under a regime of perfect competition and in case collusion solution are respectively 
 
[4]    𝑝∗𝑑 = 𝑐[1 + 𝜇𝑑(?̅?)], 𝑝
𝑐𝑑 = 𝑐[1 + 𝜇𝑟][1 + 𝜇𝑑(?̅?)] 
 
The four alternative results of the profit maximization algorithm are illustrated in Figure 1 for 
three places characterized by LA = 0, LB < LC. It is worth noticing how an important result is that 
the market equilibrium is affected by two sources of inefficiency: one depends on firms’ market 
power, and one depends on the existence of distance costs. In the example provided, the 
existence of distance costs determines the absence of the market in place C.  
Specifically, 
𝑝 =
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽  𝑎𝑚0𝑛0
(1 – 𝜇𝑚?̅?)(1 – 𝜇𝑛?̅?) − 𝑌
𝑏𝑛0(1 – 𝜇𝑛?̅?)
= 𝑐[1 + 𝜇𝑟][1 + 𝜇𝑑?̅?] 
It follows that 
 
[5]  𝑌 = 𝑛0(1 – 𝜇𝑛?̅?) {
𝛼
𝛼+𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0(1 – 𝜇𝑚?̅?) − 𝑐𝑏[1 + 𝜇𝑟][1 + 𝜇𝑑?̅?]} 
 
Equation [5] can be written also as 
 
𝑀𝑅(𝑌) = 𝐴(?̅?) − 2𝐵(?̅?)𝑌 =
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽  𝑎𝑚0𝑛0
(1 – 𝜇𝑚𝐿)(1 – 𝜇𝑛𝐿) − 2𝑌
𝑏𝑛0(1 – 𝜇𝑛𝐿)
= 𝑐[1 + 𝜇𝑑?̅?] = 𝑀𝐶(𝑌) 
 
It follows that 
𝑌 = 0,5𝑛0(1 – 𝜇𝑛𝐿) (
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0(1 – 𝜇𝑚𝐿) − 𝑐𝑏[1 + 𝜇𝑑?̅?])  
As μm and μn exist by construction, we focus the analysis on how the level of Y changes due to: i) 
a positive mark-up imposed by the industry (collusion), and ii) a positive mark-up due to 
distance costs. Specifically, there are four possible equilibria: 
- perfect competition and absence of distance costs: 
𝑌∗ = 𝑛0(1 – 𝜇𝑛𝐿) {
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0(1 – 𝜇𝑚𝐿) − 𝑐𝑏} 
 
- collusion and absence of distance costs; 
 
𝑌𝑐 = 0,5 𝑛0(1 – 𝜇𝑛𝐿) {
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0(1 – 𝜇𝑚𝐿) − 𝑐𝑏} 
 
- perfect competition and positive distance costs; 
 
𝑌∗𝑑 = 𝑛0(1 – 𝜇𝑛𝐿) {
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0(1 – 𝜇𝑚𝐿) − 𝑐𝑏[1 + 𝜇𝑑𝐿]} 
 
- collusion and positive distance costs. 
 
𝑌𝑐𝑑 = 0,5 𝑛0(1 – 𝜇𝑛𝐿) {
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0(1 – 𝜇𝑚𝐿) − 𝑐𝑏[1 + 𝜇𝑑𝐿]} 
 
 The same equations can be rewritten as: 
 
𝑌∗ = 𝑛0
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0(1 – 𝜇𝑚𝐿) – 𝑛0𝜇𝑛𝐿
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0(1 – 𝜇𝑚𝐿) − 𝑛0𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑏 𝑛0𝜇𝑛𝐿 = 
= 𝑛0
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0 − 𝑛0
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0𝜇𝑚𝐿 – 
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0𝑛0𝜇𝑛𝐿 +
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0𝑛0𝜇𝑛𝜇𝑚𝐿
2 − 
−𝑛0𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑏 𝑛0𝜇𝑛𝐿 = 
= 𝑛0 (
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0 − 𝑐𝑏) − 𝑛0 (
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0(𝜇𝑚 + 𝜇𝑛) + 𝑐𝑏 𝜇𝑛 ) 𝐿 + 𝑛0
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0𝜇𝑛𝜇𝑚𝐿
2 = 
= 𝐴 − 𝐵𝐿 + 𝐶𝐿2 
 
𝑌𝑐 = 0,5𝑛0
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0(1 – 𝜇𝑚𝐿) –  0,5𝑛0𝜇𝑛𝐿
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0(1 – 𝜇𝑚𝐿) − 0,5𝑛0𝑐𝑏 + 
+0,5𝑐𝑏 𝑛0𝜇𝑛𝐿 = 
= 0,5𝑛0 (
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0 − 𝑐𝑏) − 0,5𝑛0 (
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0(𝜇𝑚 + 𝜇𝑛) + 𝑐𝑏𝜇𝑛) 𝐿 + 
+0,5𝑛0 (
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0𝜇𝑛𝜇𝑚) 𝐿
2 = 
= 0,5(𝐴 − 𝐵𝐿 + 𝐶𝐿2) 
 
𝑌∗𝑑 = 𝑛0
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0(1 – 𝜇𝑚𝐿) – 𝑛0𝜇𝑛𝐿
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0(1 – 𝜇𝑚𝐿) − 𝑛0𝑐𝑏 + 𝑐𝑏 𝑛0𝜇𝑛𝐿 − 
−𝑛0𝑐𝑏𝜇𝑑𝐿 + 𝑐𝑏 𝑛0𝜇𝑛𝜇𝑑𝐿
2 = 
= 𝑛0
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0 − 𝑛0𝑐𝑏 − 𝑛0
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0𝜇𝑚𝐿 – 
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0𝑛0𝜇𝑛𝐿 + 𝑐𝑏 𝑛0𝜇𝑛𝐿 − 𝑛0𝑐𝑏𝜇𝑑𝐿 
+
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0𝑛0𝜇𝑛𝜇𝑚𝐿
2 + 𝑐𝑏 𝑛0𝜇𝑛𝜇𝑑𝐿
2 = 
= 𝑛0 (
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0 − 𝑐𝑏) − 𝑛0 (
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0(𝜇𝑚 + 𝜇𝑛) + 𝑐𝑏(𝜇𝑛 − 𝜇𝑑)) 𝐿 + 
+𝑛0 (
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0𝜇𝑛𝜇𝑚 − 𝑐𝑏 𝜇𝑛𝜇𝑑) 𝐿
2 = 
= 𝐴′ − 𝐵′𝐿 + 𝐶′𝐿2 
 
𝑌𝑐𝑑 = 0,5𝑛0
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0(1 – 𝜇𝑚𝐿) –  0,5𝑛0𝜇𝑛𝐿
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0(1 – 𝜇𝑚𝐿) − 0,5𝑛0𝑐𝑏 − 
−0,5𝑛0𝑐𝑏𝜇𝑑𝐿 + 0,5𝑛0𝑐𝑏 𝜇𝑛𝐿 +  0,5𝑛0𝑐𝑏𝜇𝑛𝜇𝑑𝐿
2 = 
= 0,5𝑛0 (
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0 − 𝑐𝑏) − 0,5𝑛0 (
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0(𝜇𝑚 + 𝜇𝑛) − 𝑐𝑏(𝜇𝑛 − 𝜇𝑑)) 𝐿 + 
+0,5𝑛0 (
𝛼
𝛼 + 𝛽
 𝑎𝑚0𝜇𝑛𝜇𝑚 + 𝑐𝑏 𝜇𝑛𝜇𝑑) 𝐿
2 = 
= 0,5(𝐴′ − 𝐵′′′𝐿 + 𝐶′′′𝐿2) 
 
Laying on these results, Figure 2 illustrates how the level of output exchanged on the market.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The logical Framework 
 
 
